An interesting opinion was issued by the Northern District of Oklahoma recently. Interesting on several fronts, actually. The case involved a "devout Muslim" who followed the tenets of Islam that "purport to advise followers to use Muslim prayer oils to enhance the spiritual value of their five daily prayers." The Department of Corrections had enacted a rule that, with a few exceptions, banned the sale of Muslim prayer oils in prison canteens and banned the in-cell possession and use of such oils by inmates. The plaintiff sued, claiming a violation of the First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. Several years ago, the Northern District granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Northern District's decision with respect to the First Amendment claim, noting that the defendant's policy was "rationally related to a legitimate penological interest." (The Tenth Circuit's opinion can be found here.) The Court remanded for purposes of allowing the district to consider whether the plaintiff -- who was pro se -- had adequately stated a claim under the "Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act" or "RLUIPA." (RLUIPA can be found here and is discussed here.)
Following remand to the Northern District, the Court found that the plaintiff had stated a RLUIPA claim and, thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Instead of granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the Court found that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment, even though the defendant had not formally filed a Rule 56 motion. In its order, the Court noted that "[t]he weight of authority is that summary judgment may be rendered in favor of the opposing party even though he has made no formal cross-motion under rule 56." According to the court, summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party is appropriate where "the Court can determine that the non-moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and if there is no procedural prejudice to the moving party. No procedural prejudice results if the court finds that the parties had the opportunity to present and did present all of the applicable facts concerning the parameters of their positions."
And the Court found that the parties had a "full opportunity to explore the scope of their positions." Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that summary judgment was appropriate in favor of the DOC because the DOC had "demonstrated that the compelling state interest in maintaining security and order in a hostile penal system outweighs [the plaintiff's] interest in having the prayer oils in his cell and that limiting access to the prayers [sic] oils to that stored in the chapel or other facility is the least restrictive means of furthering the state's interests."
